Security
The neonto MCP server confines file access to your open workspace by default and requires an authenticated session before it will respond to any request.
Workspace confinement
File-touching tools resolve every path argument an agent supplies and reject any path that falls outside the currently open workspace folders. This protects against an agent (or content injected into a prompt) trying to read or overwrite files outside your project via .. traversal or an absolute path.
The following tools are subject to this check:
shacl_validationsparql_queryvocabulary_lookupvalidate_turtle_syntaxvalidate_yarrrmlformat_turtlerun_yarrrmlyarrrml_inspect_sourceget_diagnostics
The remaining tools — SPARQL endpoint discovery, vocabulary domain lookup, YARRRML function listing, and the agent guides — never touch the local filesystem.
Allowing access outside the workspace
The neonto.mcp.allowExternalPaths setting controls this confinement:
- Default:
false. Paths outside every open workspace folder are rejected with an error. If no workspace folder is open, there is no boundary to confine to, so all file access fails closed. true. Opts out of the check entirely, allowing the listed tools to read and write any path on disk that the extension process can reach.
Only enable neonto.mcp.allowExternalPaths if you genuinely need an agent to work on files outside your workspace, and understand that doing so removes the workspace boundary for every tool in the list above.
Authentication
Every request to the MCP server is authenticated before it is processed. An unauthenticated request — for example, before you have logged in, or if your license has expired — receives an HTTP 401 response. This means an agent cannot use the MCP server at all until you have a valid neonto license and are logged in.
Request size limit
The server enforces a maximum request body size (10 MB). Requests larger than this are rejected with an HTTP 413 response.
Guidance for running autonomous agents
- Keep
neonto.mcp.allowExternalPathsoff unless you have a specific, temporary need for it, and turn it back off afterward. - Review what workspace folders are open before granting an autonomous agent broad tool access — confinement is scoped to whichever folders are currently open in VS Code.
- Treat
run_yarrrmlandsparql_query'soutputFilePathas write operations: an agent can create or overwrite files within the workspace boundary. Use source control so unwanted changes are easy to spot and revert. See Tool Reference for a detailed explanation of what each tool reads and writes. - Never paste SPARQL endpoint credentials into the chat. Register protected endpoints through the neonto extension UI instead — the extension applies your stored credentials behind the scenes without ever exposing them to the agent.